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I
HISTORY AND THEORY OF COMMON MARKET ANTiTmST
In 1957, an improbable and in fact revolutionary event took place in Western
Europe. Six sovereign countries, by treaty, transferred control over large sectors
of their industrial economy to a supranational institution, the Europear Economic
Community. Among the most surprising provisions of the Rome Treaty establishing
this Common Market were Articles 85 and 86,1 which are directed, roughly speaking,
at the same restrictive business practices as are covered by section i of the Sherman
Act of i89o, section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936.
Article 85(i) and (2) of the Rome Treaty brand as illegal all agreements, decisions,
and concerted practices of enterprises which are apt to affect commerce among the
six member states of the Common Market and have as their object or effect the pre-
vention, restriction, or adulteration of competition within the Market. Among the
practices specifically enumerated in the Article are horizontal or vertical price-
fixing; the limitation or control of production, distribution, technical development,
and investment; the dividing of markets or sources of supply; tie-in sales; full-line
forcing; and discriminatory prices or other sales conditions.
This is all encompassing and sophisticated language. Restrictive practices are to
be adjudged mainly on the basis of their actual and potential effect on competition;
the intent of the parties is of only secondary significance. The prohibition applies
to "all concerted practices" of enterprises and "decisions" of associations, which
necessarily cover tacit agreements or gentlemen's understandings and may cover
more. It is also conceded by the commentators that these prohibitions may apply
to business activities that are primarily confined to a single country provided they have
an effect on trade among member states.
Provision' is made in Article 85(3) for granting exemptions for business restrictions
"which contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of com-
modities or to the promotion of technological or economic progress." However, this
broad exemption is qualified by three safeguards: that the restrictive arrangement
result in some benefit to consumers, that it not be more restrictive than is necessary
*Private practice Washington, D.C.; former Chief, Judgments and Judgment Enforcement Section,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice; former Secretary, United Nations Committee on Restrictive
Business Practices.
'Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, z957, x CCH Comm. MYT. REP.
1 -'5449, 298 U.N.T.S. 14"94 [hereinafter dted as Rome Treaty, art. -].
: 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 3, 14 (1970).
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to achieve the permitted rationalization purposes, and that it not eliminate com-
petition in respect of a substantial portion of the commodities involved.
As was set forth in Regulation 17 of the Council of the European Economic
Community, effective March 13, 1962, the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86 of the
Treaty are immediately effective; they require no prior decision by either .the judicial
or the administrative arm of the Common Market to make them operative.3 Thus,
a defendant in a patent or trademark infringement, unfair competition, or contract
suit in a French or Dutch court may plead as a defense that the plaintiff has violated
Articles 85 and 86. When it does so, the national court must either pass on that
defense or refer it for resolution to the European Court in Luxembourg.
National antitrust authorities are permitted to apply Articles 85(1) and (2) and
86, but only until such time as the Commission, the administrative arm of the
Common Market, has taken action. The Commission has sole authority to grant
the exemption provided for under Article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty or to issue a
negative clearance to the effect that a given practice is not prohibited by Articles
85(1) and (2) thereof.4
There was nothing in the prior legal or constitutional history of the six original
members of the Common Market that would prepare one for such a bold step
forward in the area of antitrust enforcement and the regulation of international
trade As of 1957, Italy had no antitrust law at all-and it still has none. Luxembourg
did not adopt a law against competitive restraints until September, 197o, and no
case has as yet arisen under this statute. When the Belgian Government concerned
itself with antitrust, it was largely to help cartel-minded producers promote manda-
tory industry-wide cartels binding on dissenters; it was not until 196o that Belgium
passed a rather pallid and since unenforced statute against abuse of monopoly
power. The Netherlands, a leading democratic specimen of the co-operative state,
had in 1956 passed an Economic Competition Act that required the registration of
cartels and authorized their scrutiny to see whether they were in the public interest.
This law retained authority in the Netherlands government to require dissenting
producers to join a cartel and forbade compliance with the antitrust laws of any
foreign state-meaning the United States.' France, which had an x8th Century
i CCH CoMms. MxT. REP. 240X (1962).
The commentaries on Common Market antitrust law most available to American readers are
A. DERINOER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (x968); C. ORDoa Pan,
A. GLEISS & M. Hascss, COMMaON MARKET CARTEL LAW (2d ed. 1971).
This history is comprehensively set forth in four volumes sponsored by SPECIAL CoMMrraE ON THE
EUROPEAN CoMMasON MARK.ET, Ass'N OF Tna BAR OF NEw YoR, BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMsON
MARKET NATIONS (H. Blake & J. Rahl eds. 1969-1970). Shorter summaries of the German, French,
Dutch, British, and Common Market antitrust laws (with bibliography) are to be found in Timberg,
United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws, in A LAwYv's GUME TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TnANs-
ACTIONs 619-716 (W. Surrey & C. Shaw eds. x963) (Joint Comm. on Continuing Legal Education of the
ALI and ABA).
'N. V. Philips, a leading Dutch combine, had been a defendant in United States v. General Elec. Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. X949), and the Netherlands Government had protested this on international law
grounds.
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Revolutionary and a Code Napoleon tradition of laws against monopolies and the
cornering of markets, as of 1957 was still relying for such antitrust policy as it had
on a provision of a World War II price control decree; there was a reasonably
effective government policy against resale price maintenance, but on the surface very
little more. And Germany, where the Occupying Powers during World War II
had brought about some measure of deconcentration and decartelization, had finally
passed in 1957, after a long struggle, a law prohibiting trade restraints generally,
but leaving open a wide area of outright class exemptions and individually admin-
istered immunities.
Thus, at the inauguration of the Common Market the legal attitude toward
cartels among the six Common Market countries, with the exception of Germany,
was one either of indifference or of lukewarmness. Also raising obstacles to the
adoption of a common antitrust policy was the institutional and cultural heterogeneity
of the Common Market--six countries, five languages, different industrial and
marketing styles, different ways of viewing the "free market" economy. The post-
World War II European business community was on' the whole as cartel-minded as
the pre-World War II one. Although there were a few supranational firms, industry
on the whole was in favor of retaining the conventional system of nationally exclusive
markets. The labor movement in general tended to follow the lead of the in-
dustrialists in industry matters, with the more Marxist leaders opting for broader
degrees of national and worker control of industries than their more conservative
colleagues but neither group sponsoring pro-competitive policies.
Given the forces making for business restrictionism and national autarchy, what
were the positive forces that created this competitive breakthrough? This question
is important for more than historical reasons. It is only by measuring the relative
strength of the conflicting nationalist and "European" influences at work within the
Common Market that one can form any judgment concerning the direction and the
tempo of antitrust enforcement within that Market. The late General de Gaulle
was only the leading example of the nationally-minded business and government
leaders and nationalist tendencies with which the Commission of the Common
Market and its dedicated "European" staff in Brussels have had to struggle in' order
to achieve the anti-restrictionist aspirations of the Rome Treaty.
First, among pro-antitrust influences, the Common Market, which contemplates
a free transfer of goods, services, capital, and labor across national boundaries, would
be logically and economically incomplete without a complementing antitrust policy.
It would do no good to abolish governmental barriers to trade, such as tariffs and
quotas, if private firms could thereafter erect private trade and cartel barriers having
a similar effect. For this reason, the Common Market is governed by a concept of
avoiding "distortions of competition" that includes, but is much broader in scope
than, the American concept of eliminating "restraints of trade." The "distortions of
competition" which the Common Market is dedicated to eliminating include not only
cartels, but such diverse practices as tariffs, quotas, unequal turnover taxes, govern-
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ment subsidies to exporters, discriminatory freight rates, and differing national patent
and trademark laws.
Antitrust was also supported by political considerations. Antitrust (or the "free
market economy," as it is called) was the democratic counterpoise to the closed,
monolithic state capitalistic system sponsored by the Communists, who, in 1957, had
strong voter following both in France and Germany.7 This is the main reason' that
German Chancellor Erhardt took a strong position in favor of antitrust. The "free
market economy" was a political rallying cry for the middle class that would
otherwise be eliminated from the scene, and for the irritated German housewife
who found that trade guilds which would not permit new blood to enter the trade
were costing her dearly on many of the commodities and services of which she
stood in need.
There were also the businessmen, civil servants, and economists, few in number
but quite influential, who followed the inspired lead of Jean Monnet. They recog-
nized that economic union was a prelude to the political union that they felt was
needed if Europe was to become a viable third force in the world community, able
to stand up to -the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This group also
recognized the wastefulness of the cartel system which erected a price umbrella over
high-cost and inefficient producers. This realization had led to the adoption, five
years earlier, of the Paris Treaty establishing a European Coal and Steel Com-
munity.
The European Common Market is an unmistakably European phenomenon, but
it drew support and stimulation from U.S. sources. Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome
Treaty were derived in part from the work of a U.S.-sponsored United Nations Corn-
mittee on Restrictive Business Practices, which prepared a convention for the control
of restrictive business practices in international trade, as well as detailed research
reports setting forth national antitrust laws and analyzing antitrust issues and cases
The U.S. State Department, recognizing the need for greater economic and political
unity in Western Europe, lent strong support to the idea of a Common Market func-
tioning along competitive lines. Also, American businessmen interested in foreign
trade and investment deplored the Balkanization and small size of European national
markets; they felt that their own interests and the prosperity of Europe would best
be served by the establishment of a Common Market. It is significant that Servan-
Schreiber, in his appropriately named book The American Challenge, congratulated
"In countries such as Sweden and Yugoslavia even the Socialists favored a competitive free market
economy; this was a major source of friction between Yugoslavia and the more orthodox Soviet bloc.
'For English translation, see Press and Information Division of the French Embassy, Treaty Con-
stituting the European Coal and Steel Community, June 6, 595i. See also Bebr, The European Coal and
Steel Comminity, 63 YALE L.J. 1 (1953); Timberg, supra note 5, at 66x-65.
' See Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices; Analysis of Governmental Measures
Relating to Restrictive Business Practices; and Texts of National Legislative and Other Governmental
Measures Relating to Restrictive Business Practices, 16 ECOSOC, Supps. 11, isA, 11B, U.N. Docs. E/2380,
E/2379 & Add. i, E/2379/Add. 2 (1953). See also 2 G. BERNiNi, LA TuTE A DELLA LIDEA CoNCOua-NZE
E I MONOPOLI 12-42 (z963); Timberg, Restrictive Practices as an Appropriate Subject for U.N. Action,
i ANTrTRusT BuLL. 409 (1955).
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American business on having taken proper advantage of the wider consumer base
afforded by the Common Market and chided the national firms domiciled within
Europe for not bestirring themselves and doing likewise.1 °
II
SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST LAW
Of course, in both substance and procedure, the Common Market antitrust law
is a European, not an American, phenomenon. The conceptual scope of "distortions
of competition," which the Common' Market is trying to eliminate, is broader than
the class of trade restraints that U.S. antitrust law is intended to check. However, the
enforcement bite of the American antitrust law is much deeper than that of Common
Market antitrust policy.
Two basic substantive differences characterize the U.S. and the Common Market
antitrust laws. First, U.S. antitrust recognizes no distinction between "good" and
"bad" cartels; cartels are universally bad and per se illegal. As was eloquently
pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa case, U.S. antitrust law is dedicated
to the political goal of avoiding monopoly power and to the social goal of a system
of small business enterprises, regardless of the economic costs involved." Common
Market antitrust policy is not based on any such sociopolitical premises. Cartels
are to be condemned primarily because they are economically wasteful and will be
tolerated if they can show efficiencies in production and distribution. That is the
rationale of the Article 85(3) exemption.
The other major distinction between Common Market-and also British-and
U.S. antitrust approaches is the comparative attitude toward monopoly. The Western
Europeans, like the British, see nothing inherently illegal in a monopoly or dom-
inant position in a market; illegal monopolization as defined in section 2 of the
Sherman Act has nb counterpart in the Common Market. Thus, Article 86 of the
Rome Treaty recognizes that enterprises with dominant positions may abuse their
position by charging unreasonable prices or refusing to deal with customers. How-
ever, when the Commission of the Common Market decided to attack Continental
Can's acquisition of a Dutch packaging company within the Common Market as
an abuse of dominant position, it took most of the European antitrust commentators
by surprise.'2
Prior to the proceeding against Continental Can, a vast number of acquisitions
and joint ventures had taken place in the Common Market, most of which involved
U.S. firms as the acquiring firm or the moving partner."3 A few of these, par-
" Servan-Sehreiber's work was published in 1968 by Athenaeum Press.
"'United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 4-6 (2d Cir. 1945).
is 2 OCH Comm. MxT. REP. 9481 (1971).
'During the period 1958 to x965, U.S. firms made 530 acquisitions and formed 582 joint ventures
in the Common Market. See statement of Chairman Dixon of the FTC in Hearings Pursuant to s. Res.
z91 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Seas. 511-15 (1966). See also Press Releases, U.S. Investments in E..C., 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. RE,.
'K 9 3 87 (1970), 9477 (1971).
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ticularly in the computer and electronics industries, had aroused popular protest but
led to no action by the Commission. On the national level, Germany's antitrust law
required the reporting of mergers or acquisitions that resulted in the combined firm
having more than twenty per cent occupation of the market, but this reporting pro-
vision was not effective because the German Cartel Court was unable to make the
statistical determination when a merger encompassed the necessary percentage of
the industry. Amendments are currently under consideration to strengthen the
German law against mergers. Likewise, the European Coal and Steel Community
had provisions requiring notification, and official approval, of mergers and acquisi-
tons in the coal and steel industries, but practically all proposed mergers and acquisi-
tions within those industries were contummated without objection from the Commu-
nity. Not only were mergers justified by Common Market businessmen and officials
as a method of bringing about community-wide competition, but even the Marxist-
inclined labor movement favored mergers on the ground that monopolized industries
would be easier, in the long run, to nationalize.
One of the EEC Commissioners has recently stated that the Commission system-
atically investigates mergers in twenty industries with oligopolistic structures and
some -forty industries characterized by increased merger activity 4 Despite this
and the Continental Can proceeding, the current attitudes of the Commission on the
monopoly problem is reflected in a recent Commission memorandum on industrial
policy, the main thrust of which was the need to develop more and bigger trans-
national European enterprises which will combine capital and manpower on an
efficient scale so as "to compete effectively in Europe and in the world markets with
the giants from across the Atlantic."' 5 In order to develop such new multinational
corporations, mergers may be both subsidized and arranged by the Community.
This new merger movement, if it comes into effect, will concentrate specially on
industries which are of vital importante for economic, technological, or political
reasons.
It will be difficult indeed to reconcile this new industrial policy with the older
Common Market competition policy. But it should be borne in mind that U.S.
antimerger policy has not prevented U.S. firms from getting bigger and bigger,
although it has also led them to invest in a massive wave of acquisitions within the
Common Market. Also, it is difficult to maintain an effective competition policy
in Europe without an international competition policy involving Europe, the United
States, and Japan.
III
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
In respect of administrative procedures, the Common Market deviates widely
"' See Rahl, Common Market and European Antitrust Systems: An Overview, 40 ArnTRUST L.J.
76.5, 773-74 (1971)- 1 "
112 CCHI Coznf. MitT. REP. 9354 (197o); Mestmkcker, The Multinational Corporation, 40 ARutUST
L.J. 986, 987-88 ('97').
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from the American approach; it has adopted enforcement procedures more consistent
with the national legal systems of its member countries. Thus the Common Market
relies heavily on registration procedures.36 Parties that desire to invoke Article 85(3)
as a justification for business restrictions that would otherwise be prohibited by
Article 85(1) are generally required to register their agreements with the Com-
mission, if they wish to avoid the risk of retroactive liability for their past activities.
When the Temporary Nationul Economic Commission of the United States in 1939
recommended that patent license agreements be filed with the Federal Trade Com-
mission," its recommendation fell on deaf ears because it was felt that such filing
would carry with it an immunity for the filed agreements and was inconsistent with
our selective method of antitrust enforcement. Evidently the Common Market anti-
trust authorities regarded the thousands of agreements that were filed with them
as an educational opportunity and considered the massive job of reviewing these
agreements as a worthwhile endeavor in formulating over-all antitrust policy.
The Commission of the Common Market is more amenable than are U.S.
antitrust authorities to giving advisory opinions. As already mentioned, individual
parties can request the Commission for so-called "negative clearances," or rulings that
their restrictive agreements are not covered by Article 85(1). Also, on December 23,
1962, the Commission of the Common Market issued two important general declara-
tions. One of these indicated that certain kinds of exclusive agency agreements would
not be considered as falling within the prohibitions of Article 85(1) .8 The other
stated that certain restrictions and obligations could be included in patent license
agreements as within the scope of the patent monopoly without violating Article
85(1?
The Common Market's lack of a doctrinaire per se violation approach, plus its
pragmatic administrative philosophy, has enabled it to eliminate consideration of a
host of frequently inconsequential business restrictions that would raise problems
under American antitrust law. Thus, in July, 1968, the Commission announced that
it would not regard as a violation of Article 85(I) co-operation between small and
medium sized enterprises involving such activities as market research, accounting
practices, credit guarantees, debt collection procedures, research and development
projects, joint use of production, transportation and storage facilities, joint ad-
vertising, use of common quality labels, and joint selling and repair service arrange-
ments2 o In June, 197o, the Community issued its so-called Bagatelle Notice to the
effect that Article 85(1) of the Treaty would not be applied to agreements, decisions,
"' In addition, the Common Market can obtain help from the antitrust enforcement authorities of the
member states and may investigate company records. It also has the power, which it has exercised, to fine
companies refusing to submit their records.
5 7 TnipoRAsY NAmO NAL EcoNoMIC CoM 'N, FINAL REPoRT AND RPcoMwENDATioN, S. Doc. No.
35, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1941).
is C CH Comm. MrK. REP. 2697 (1962). Exclusive agents differ from exclusive distributors in that
tide to the distributed goods does not pass and the agent is subject to the control of his principal.
19 1 CCH Comm. Mmr. REP. 2698 (1962).
go O CCH Comm. MKT. Ra'. 2699 (z968).
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or concerted practices where (a) the co-operating parties accounted for not more
than five per cent of turnover for similar products (that is, those considered similar
by consumers on the basis of their properties, utility, and price) and (b) the total
annual turnover of the co-operating parties was not more than $15 million or in
certain cases $20 million. 1 In 1971, the Community granted a group exemption
udder Article 85(3) for co-operative arrangements involving certain kinds of research
and development, standardization, and specialization. This is in marked contrast
to the American scene, where per se antitrust violation approaches frequently trigger
antitrust, or Robinson-Patman, cases that have a truly minimal impact on the
U.S. economy.
Another distinguishing characteristic of Common Market antitrust is the dis-
position of its enforcement authorities to dispose of cases informally, by allowing the
parties to modify agreements and eliminate provisions that are objectionable anti-
trustwise. By way of contrast, U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies are more prone
to launch judicial or administrative proceedings even in situations where the parties
have rectified their practices prior to the institution of the proceeding.
One strong adjunct of U.S. antitrust enforcement has not yet made its way onto
the European scene-the private treble damage action. However, as will be indicated,
enterprises that violate Common Market antitrust norms run the risk of heavy fines
and of losing some of their patent, trademark, and contractual rights.
IV
CAsE D VELOPMENTS
Given the nationalistic influences that are still at work within the Common
Market, substantive antitrust standards that are more lenient than those prevailing
in the United States, and administrative procedures that appear to be more relaxed
than those employed in the United States, how has antitrust fared in the Common
Market?
Perhaps the leading showpiece of Common Market jurisprudence is the
Grundig-Consten case, decided by the European Court of Justice in 1967.22 In this
case, Grundig, a German manufacturer of TV, radio, and sound reproduction
equipment, had granted to a French distributor, Consten, the exclusive right to
distribute Grundig equipment in France and the exclusive right to a trademark
Grundig had registered in France. The German manufacturer had stipulated in
its agreements with its Common Market distributors that they would nt ship the
equipment outside of their assigned exclusive territories. Both provisions were
designed to prevent third persons from importing Grundig's equipment into France.
The Court of Justice held that this arrangement was designed to isolate the French
213 CCH CoM. Mavr. REP. 9367 (97o).
" Etablissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. E.E.C. Comm'n, 12 Recueil de la Cour 429
[Court Decisions 1961-i966 Transfer Binder], CCH Comm. M T. REP. 8046 (x966).
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market from competition and, accordingly, distorted competition within the Common
Market in violation of Article 85(i) of the Common Market Treaty.
When the European Court at Luxembourg decided that this purely vertical
allocation of exclusive territories by a manufacturer to its distributors was an antitrust
violation, that issue, curiously enough, was still open in the United States. In the brief
he presented to the European Court, its Advocate General relied on a 1963 decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in the White Motor case23 for the recommendation that it not
adopt a per se rule, but rather consider the effect of exclusive territories on inter-brand
competition and on market prices. The Court declined to follow its Advocate Gen-
eral's recommendation and held that the allocation was a per se antitrust violation.
One year later, in 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Schwinn case held to the
same effect.24 Thus, the paradoxical result came about that the first major decision
under the Common Market antitrust law anticipated by a year a decision not
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court until the Sherman Act was seventy-eight years
old. As late as March, 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Topco case had occasion
to reverse a lower court that had declined to follow its ruling in Schwinn.2 5
Of course, the Common Market does not follow all the implications of the Schwinn
case. Thus, in the recent Omega decision, the Commission struck down exclusive
territorial restrictions but gave an' Article 85(3) exemption to a system whereby
Omega's general representatives could sell only through franchised dealers who in
turn were forbidden to sell to non-franchised dealers.26 Also, a Common Market
manufacturer can impose restrictions on his distributors' promotion and advertising.
Nevertheless, the mere striking down of export and import restrictions within the
Common Market can have an immediate effect on price. Thus, in the recent Agfa-
Gevaert case, the Commision held that a provision preventing parties from importing
color film from Belgium into Germany violated Article 85(1) .2 Since the German
sales price was higher than the Belgian, this meant that Agfa-Gevaert had to give
up a system of resale price maintenance which it had established in Germany.
In the area of horizontal price-fixing, the Commission has recently scored two
major victories. The six firms involved in the Quinine Cartel case (the basic
investigation of which had been done by U.S. Senator Harts Antitrust Subcommittee
in Washington) were fintd a total of $5oo,ooo,28 and the ten companies involved in the
Dyestuffs Cartel case were fined a like amount29 Three of the dyestuffs firms were
Swiss and one was British, evidencing a willingness on the part of the European
23 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (i968).
"
5 United States v. Topeo Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (IR72), rev'g 319 F. uPP. 1031 (N.D. Ill. x97o).
25 2CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9346, 9396 (1970).
272 OCH COMM. MsLT. RE. 9339 (3969).
"8 [New Developments Apr., 1965-Dec., z969 Transfer Binder] OCH Comm. MIT. REP. 9313
(1969); 2 CCH Comn. MKT. REP. 9484 (197I).
"1 [New Developments Apr., I965-Dec., 3969 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. M.KT. REP. 9314
(r969); 2 CCH Comm . MKT. REP. 9397 (1970).
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Economic Community to enforce its antitrust law extraterritorially °--quite a de-
batable legal position as far as most European international lawyers are concerned
and one which is being appealed to the European Court.
Perhaps the most spectacular and controversial of the victories won by Common
Market antitrust have been in the area of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Prior
to the Rome Treaty, the holder of any national patent or trademark right was able to
exercise that right to prevent the importation into its country of any product bearing
an infringing patent or trademark. Article 36 of the Rome Treaty seemed to confirm
this barrier to international trade.
In a series of landmark cases, the European Court has held that Article 85, and
in fact the very purpose of the Rome Treaty, prevent the maintenance of exclusive
national territories for the holders of industrial property rights. Thus, in the Sirena-
Eda decision of February, x971, the holder of an Italian trademark (obtained from
an American manufacturer) on a shaving cream was held foreclosed under Article
85(I) from invoking the trademark to prevent the importation into Italy of shaving
cream from Germany bearing the same trademark (licensed to a German firm by
the same American firm).Y' The Court surmounted the difficulty that Article 85
applies only to "agreements," by pointing out that both the Italian and the German
companies had acquired their respective rights to use the trademark under agree-
ments with the American manufacturer.
In the Grammophon-Metro case, decided in June, 1971, a German record manu-
facturer tried to assert the special reproducing ("neighboring") right it had under
German copyright legislation to bar the reimportation into Germany of records which
it had sold into France and which were reappearing on the German market via
Switzerland. 2 This time the European Court conceded that neither Article 85 nor
Article 86 applied, but referred to the rule laid down in Articles 30 and 34 requiring
the member states of the Common Market to eliminate all quantitative restrictions on
the free flow of goods among them. The Court held that there was no legal basis for
protecting the "neighboring right" of the German manufacturer where the records
had already been put into circulation in a foreign market (France), and that pro-
hibiting reimportation of the records into Germany would frustrate the fundamental
goal of the Rome Treaty-the creation of a single common market.
, Whether the Sirena-Eda and Grammophon-Metro cases will apply to the situation
where different parties have been given parallel patents in two or more European
countries has not yet been adjudicated by the European Court. There is some
0 The illegal acts took place within the Community; the extraterritoriality feature lay in making tho
Swiss and British parent firms responsible for those acts. Since this address was delivered, the European
Court-at Luxembourg upheld the decision of the Commission holding the Swiss and British firms liable, see
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission of the European Community, 2 CCH Comm. MxT. Rpa,.
816I (1972).
" Sirena S. r. I. v. Eda GmbH, 17 Recuell de la Cour 69, 2 OCH Corms. MxT. REP. 81oi (1971).
In reaching its decision, the European Court ignored a contrary recommendation of the EEC Commission.
" Deutsche Grammaphon v. Metro-Sp-GrossmHrkte, Case No. 78/7o (Cour de justice de la Com-
munit6 europfenne, June 8, 1971), 2 CCH Comm,. MmT. Rta. 8io6.
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feeling that the Court has a basis for distinguishing between a patent on the one hand,
and trademarks and neighboring rights on the other. In the Parke, Davis case,
decided in February, 1968, the European Court held that Parke, Davis could validly
assert its Dutch patent to prevent the importation from Italy into the Netherlands
of certain drugs the patents on which it had licensed to a Dutch licensee23 But in
this case there was the distinguishing point that drugs are not patentable in Italy.
Had the drugs been imported into the Netherlands from a country (for example,
Germany) where the importing party held a patent license from Parke, Davis, the
argument could well have been made that the patent monopoly had been exhausted
by the first sale in Germany and that, consistently with the premise of a single com-
mon market, the Dutch patent could not be invoked to bar the drug from the
Netherlands. This may be where the Common Market law on parallel patents will
come out, though some of the European commentators disagree.34
CONCLUSION
Neither in the Common Market nor in the United States can a mere summary of
administrative and court decisions indicate how effective antitrust has been in creating
a more competitive economy. In evaluating the European' Common Market achieve-
ment, it will help to remember that the establishment of the Common Market
(more detailed than, but comparable to, the U.S. interstate commerce clause)
and the adoption of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty took place only fifteen
years ago. In the United States, despite a common language and common legal
heritage, it was not until thirty-five years after -the adoption of the federal Constitution
that a consummate judicial politician, Chief Justice Marshall, was able in Gibbons v.
Ogden to establish the legal foundations of the U.S. common market.35
The U.S. Sherman Act prohibitions against trade restraints and monopolies
were founded on an English legal tradition going back to the i4th Century. The
Act, which was passed unanimously, was the reflection of a popular antagonism
toward trusts that had already led to the passage of a dozen state "Sherman Acts";
by 1898, two-thirds of the states had such laws.3 6 Yet the federal government lost
five of the first six Sherman Act cases it brought in the District Courts. Nobody
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Berle,4° and the statistics of oligopoly, concentration, and administered prices in the
United States can arrive at an optimistic evaluation of the effectiveness of its anti-
trust enforcement. Considering the difficulties created by Western Europe's diverse
legal traditions and prior history of toleration of cartel practices, it can safely be said
that the legal articulation of an antitrust policy for the Common Market has been
truly impressive.
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